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United States v. Quinones
313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002)
United States v. Quinones
317 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2002)
I. Background
The United States Government filed notice of its intention to seek the death
penalty against Alan Quinones ("Quinones") under the Federal Death Penalty
Act ("FDPA").' In response, Quinones filed a motion to declare the FDPA
unconstitutional.2 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted Quinones's motion to strike all death penalty notices and
declared the FDPA unconstitutional.3 The district court based its holding on
statistical evidence that the government was executing significantly more inno-
cent people than previously supposed.4 The district court also found the FDPA
unconstitutional because convincing proof of innocence often does not emerge
until many years after the conviction in question.' The Government appealed.6
II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and
remanded.7 The Second Circuit first found that it had jurisdiction to consider the
appeal and that the constitutional issue was ripe for adjudication.' It then held
1. United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49,52 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Quinones lIr'); Federal Death
Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3591-3598 (2000).
2. .Quinones III, 313 F.3d at 52.
3. United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (".Quinones It').
The district court first issued a preliminary opinion and order in which it stated its intention to
grant Quinones's motion to dismiss all death penalty aspects from the case. See United States v.
Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Quinones "). The court then allowed the
Government to submit additional briefs in opposition to Quinones's motion. Quinones II, 205 F.
Supp. 2d at 257. After considering both arguments, the district court reaffirmed its preliminary
opinion and granted Quinones's motion. Id.
4. Quinones II, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
5. Id.
6. Quinones III, 313 F.3d at 52. For a complete discussion and analysis of .uinones II, see
generally Philip H. Yoon, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 293 (2002) (analyzing United States v.
Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), and United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469 (D.
Vt 2002)).
7. Quinones III, 313 F.3d at 70.
8. Id. at 52. The issues of jurisdiction and ripeness will not be further discussed in this note.
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that Quinones's constitutional arguments were foreclosed by Supreme Court
precedent.9 Quinones filed a petition for a rehearing and argued that the Second
Circuit misunderstood his argument, the district court's opinion, and United
States Supreme Court precedent; the Second Circuit denied this petition.10
III. Anay~sis
The Second Circuit addressed the district court's holding that the FDPA
violates the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution." The Second
Circuit stated that" 'it is apparent from the text of the Constitution itself that the
existence of capital punishment was accepted by the Framers.' ,,. The Second
Circuit also criticized the district court's Fifth Amendment analysis and alleged
that the analysis was based on "evolving standards of fairness and ordered
liberty."' 3 The Second Circuit stated that the Eighth Amendment, not the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, requires an analysis of the "evolving
standards."'" The Second Circuit then examined the evolving standards of
decency and found that Gregg v. Georgia 5 still permitted the death penalty "for
certain heinous crimes such as murder."' 6
The Second Circuit continued by stating that the argument that innocent
people, in small or large numbers, may be executed was not new. 7 The court
examined the history of mistaken executions of innocent persons and found that
both Congress and the Supreme Court have accepted the use of the death penalty
despite recognition of the fallibility of the judicial system." The court then stated
9. Id.
10. United States v. Quinones, 317 F.3d 86, 88, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Quinones IV').
11. Quinones III, 313 F.3d at 60-61.
12. Id. at 61 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976)); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. V (stating rights of capital defendants).
13. Quinones III, 313 F.3d at 61 (quoting Quinones II, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 260); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII (stating that cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted). The district
court actually stated that "evolving standards" apply to Eighth Amendment analysis. .Quinones II,
205 F. Supp. 2d at 259. The district court, however, stated, "[Slo too it is settled law that the Fifth
Amendment's broad guarantee of 'due process' must be interpreted in light of evolving standards
of fairness and ordered liberty." Id. at 260.
14. Quinones III, 313 F.3d at 61.
15. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
16. Quinones III, 313 F.3d at 61-62 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186-87).
17. Id. at 63.
18. Id. at 63-69 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311 (1972) (per curiam) (holding
then-current application of death penalty unconstitutional); Gegg, 428 U.S. at 207 (holding that
capital punishment is not unconstitutional per se); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993)
(stating that, even if execution of innocent persons is unconstitutional, defendants must meet
extremely high threshold)). Only one Justice found that the fallibility of the justice system could
render the death penalty unconstitutional. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 366-68 (Marshal,J., concurring).
The Second Circuit also criticized the district court's finding, based on "ground-breaking DNA
testing and other exonerative evidence," that Herrera was inapposite to Quinones's case and stated
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that "if the well-settled law on this issue is to change, that is a change that only
the Supreme Court is authorized to make."' 9
Quinones filed a petition for a panel rehearing and argued that the Second
Circuit misunderstood his argument, the opinion of the district court, and the
controlling Supreme Court cases.2" Contrary to Quinones's argument, the
Second Circuit found that the district court's opinion clearly declared the death
penalty unconstitutional per se rather than simply declaring the FDPA proce-
dures unconstitutional. 2' The Second Circuit also found that Quinones's argu-
ment in his original brief "that no procedural safeguards could render the FDPA
constitutional" necessarily asked the court to declare the death penalty unconsti-
tutional per se, which it was unwilling to do.
22
IV. Conclusion
The Second Circuit's opinion indicates the difficulty attorneys will face
when seeking an order to declare the death penalty unconstitutional per se. 3 In
light of the Second Circuit's ruling, capital defense attorneys will probably be
more successful if they launch procedural attacks on the FDPA and various state
death penalty statutes when asking courts to declare the death penalty unconsti-
tutional2 4 Capital defense attorneys in Virginia are urged to contact the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse for more information on procedurally attacking the
Virginia death penalty statutes.
Philip H. Yoon
that Herrera prevented it from finding capital punishment unconstitutional based on statistics or
theories. .Quinones II1, 313 F.3d at 69 (quoting Quinones I, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 263).
19. Quinones II1, 313 F.3d at 69.
20. .Quinones IV, 317 F.3d at 88.
21. Id. at 88-89. The Second Circuit stated that the district court's opinion "scarcely
mentioned, let alone relied upon, any particular procedures set forth in the FDPA." Id. at 89.
22. Id. at 90. The Second Circuit stated that Quinones's only procedural arguments were
contained in footnotes in his original brief. Id. The court also concluded that Quinones's argu-
ment, that the court misconstrued Supreme Court precedent, was without merit. Id
23. See, e.g., United States v. Church, 217 F. Supp. 2d 700, 700 (W.D. Va. 2002) (disagreeing
with holding in Quinones I1).
24. For an analysis of the constitutionality of Virginia's capital sentencing procedure, see
Yoon, supra note 6, at 306-08. For an analysis of the constitutionality of the FDPA, see generally
United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469 (I. Vt. 2002). For an analysis of Fell, see generally Yoon,
supra note 6.
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